Storm From The Skies: The Strategic Bomber Offensive, 1943-45 by Jackson Robert

Author:Jackson, Robert [Jackson, Robert]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: Endeavour Media
Published: 2020-01-23T16:00:00+00:00

7 - Prelude to Overlord

In November 1943 a large number of RAF squadrons were transferred from the various Commands to the 2nd Tactical Air Force, which had been created to provide the necessary air striking power in support of the coming Allied invasion of Europe. It consisted of four Groups: Nos 83 and 84 Groups were to provide tactical support for the 1st Canadian and 2nd British Armies, No. 85 Group was to defend the Allied bridgehead across the Channel once it had been established, and the medium bombers — Marauders, Mitchells, Mosquitoes and Bostons — of No. 2 Group were to strike at communications and supplies behind the enemy lines. There was also a Reconnaissance Wing and an Air Spotting Pool, and the massive task of furnishing air transport and supply fell to No. 38 Group. All these units, together with the mighty power of the United States 9th Air Force, formed the framework of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force, commanded by Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory. Its total strength was 5,677 aircraft, of which 3,011 were fighters, medium bombers, light bombers and fighter-bombers.

The importance of air power, and particularly of strategic bombing, relative to the success or failure of the invasion, was a subject of constant discussion among the Chiefs of Staff during 1943. In June of that year it seemed that the Anglo-American bombing offensive, launched under the authority of the Casablanca Directive, had fallen far short of its primary goal of destroying the enemy’s economy and undermining the morale of the German people. In some fields German war production was actually on the increase; this was particularly true of fighter production, a fact that was giving the Allied leaders cause for concern. The Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander, Lieutenant-General Frederick Morgan, stated:

The most significant feature of the German Air Force in Western Europe is the steady increase in its fighter strength which, unless checked and reduced, may reach such formidable proportions as to render an amphibious assault out of the question. Above all, therefore, an overall reduction in the strength of the German fighter force between now and the time for surface assault is essential. This condition, above all others, will dictate whether amphibious assault can or cannot be successfully launched on any given date.

This viewpoint with its somewhat pessimistic undertone was not shared by the Allied bomber commanders, who firmly believed — despite the inconclusive results achieved so far — that, in the strategic bomber, they controlled the decisive instrument of modern warfare. General Spaatz, commanding the United States Strategic Air Force, remained to be convinced that an invasion was really necessary. He, together with Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris and General H. H. Arnold, the USAAF representative on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, still thought that strategic bombing alone could bring about the collapse of Germany. In this the architects of the strategic offensive were in agreement; where they continually failed to agree, on the other hand, was on the choice of targets.

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